Technology
One verification engine, built to be checked.
How Tumaini reaches an answer: which parts are AI, which are cryptography, which are rules — what has been measured, what is simulated, and what does not exist yet.
Architecture
Three experiences, one engine.
Assist, Trust and Core are front doors to the same API and the same trust-core library. There is no second backend: a person checking a voice note and a bank calling the API reach the same rules.
Experiences
Tumaini Assist
Tumaini Trust
Tumaini Core
API layer · Next.js on Vercel
The verification engine
trust-core (TypeScript, pure, unit-tested)
Media service (Python, CPU, private)
Contextual analysis adapter
PostgreSQL with row-level security
Capability ledger
What is real, what is simulated, what is not built.
“Implemented” means it runs on the live system and has automated tests. Nothing below is promoted without evidence.
| Area | Capability | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Media analysis | Voice deepfake detection | Implemented | MMS-300M-AntiDeepfake on CPU, calibrated three-way labels. |
| Media analysis | Voice transcription | Implemented | faster-whisper base; errors are common, so users can describe the request themselves. |
| Media analysis | Image manipulation detection | In research | Candidate models under evaluation. Nothing is advertised until validated. |
| Media analysis | Video deepfake detection | In research | Candidate models under evaluation. Not implemented. |
| Provenance | C2PA verification (images, video) | Implemented | Official C2PA SDK; demo trust anchors only. |
| Provenance | C2PA signing for institutions | Implemented | Demo certificates; no trusted timestamp. |
| Institutional identity | Signed authorisation receipts | Implemented | Ed25519 JWS with content hash, audience, exact scope, single use, revocation. |
| Institutional identity | Trust registry | Implemented | Demo registry; not an official trust list. |
| Context | Request extraction (EN/AR) | Implemented | Deterministic rules: money, codes, links, urgency, secrecy, new numbers. |
| Context | Gemini contextual analysis | Built, not enabled | Provider-agnostic adapter, schemas, limits and consent are built. Disabled until credentials are supplied and tested. |
| Decision | Deterministic risk policy | Implemented | AI can only add caution; it can never approve. |
| Decision | Protected-action state machine | Implemented | Enforced in application code and again by a PostgreSQL trigger. |
| Decision | Trusted-contact confirmation | Simulated | Real one-time-token flow; delivery to the contact's phone is simulated on screen. |
| Evidence | Signed evidence reports | Implemented | Case reports signed with Tumaini's evidence key; verifiable via API. |
| Evidence | Hash-chained audit log | Implemented | Per-tenant, tamper-evident. |
| Organisations | Institution portal | Implemented | Issue, revoke, keys, verification activity, incidents, audit. |
| Organisations | Webhooks | Planned | Not built. |
| People | Web verification experience | Implemented | Voice, message, image and video checks in the browser. |
| People | Tumaini Assist mobile app | Planned | Screen system designed; no native app exists. |
| People | iOS / Android share integration | Planned | Strategy documented; requires native app and on-device testing. |
| Payments | Money movement | Simulated | No real funds move. Banks and people are fictional. |
Detection, provenance, protection
Three kinds of evidence, never confused.
Detection estimates. Provenance proves. Protection enforces. Tumaini keeps them separate and tells you which is which.
Detection
ProbabilisticDoes this look synthetic?
An open pretrained model scores the voice note. It can be wrong in both directions, so it can raise caution but never approve.
- Model
- MMS-300M-AntiDeepfake
- Runs on
- CPU · no paid API
- Thresholds
- < 0.172 · > 0.859
- Calibrated on
- Held-out speakers
Scores on the demo files
- Synthetic voice note (TTS)0.9985 Likely synthetic
- Public-domain human reading0.002 Likely genuine
Easy cases — a “likely genuine” result never identifies the speaker.
Provenance
CryptographicCan the source prove it sent this?
Registered organisations sign their messages. Each check is shown — and a missing signature means “unknown”, never “fake”.
Signed authorisation · Falcon Demo Bank
Ed25519 · JWS- passedSignatureVerified
- passedIssuerRegistered · active
- passedMessage textUnchanged
- passedExpiryValid for 24 h
- passedAuthorisesAED 150.00 → AE07…3456
- informationUseOnce only
Protected action
A warning can be ignored. A hold cannot be tapped through.
Every transition is checked in application code and again by a PostgreSQL trigger. RELEASED requires a confirmed check from a contact registered before the message arrived, or a valid signed authorisation for exactly that amount and account.
- 1CREATED
- 2ASSESSING
- 3HELD
- 4PENDING
- 5VERIFIED
- 6RELEASED
- AI output can add caution — never approve.
- If the AI service is down, holds stay.
- A message cannot choose who verifies it.
- A signature authorises one action, once.
Detection
- Question
- Does this look synthetic?
- Nature
- Probabilistic score
- When absent
- Inconclusive — verify
- Role in Tumaini
- Adds caution
Provenance
- Question
- Can the source prove it sent this?
- Nature
- Cryptographic check
- When absent
- Unknown — not evidence of a fake
- Role in Tumaini
- Can satisfy a check for one exact action
Row-level security
Each visitor’s workspace is isolated inside PostgreSQL, not only in code.
Keys at rest
Issuer keys are AES-256-GCM encrypted; revoked keys are destroyed.
Untrusted inputs
Uploads are size-limited and type-sniffed; model output is treated as data.
Explainable
Every outcome lists the checks that passed or failed, in English and Arabic.
Evaluation and calibration
Tested. Measured. Transparent.
Real metrics, readable denominators and the limitations that matter.
Model. MMS-300M-AntiDeepfake (NII Yamagishi Lab), CPU inference.
Thresholds. Likely genuine below 0.172 · likely synthetic above 0.859 · inconclusive in between — frozen on a speaker-disjoint In-the-Wild calibration split (600/600).
English real-world speech (In-the-Wild, unseen speakers)
2.9%
Equal error rate. n = 1,000 genuine / 1,000 fake. Flagged synthetic: precision 99.9% (913/914), recall 91.3%.
Arabic speech (ArAD, voice conversion)
2.85%
Equal error rate. n = 484 genuine / 1,000 fake. Levantine dialect, short clips; Gulf dialects and Arabic TTS not tested.
WhatsApp-like audio (Opus 16 kbit/s, English)
6.1%
Equal error rate. n = 500 / 500. 24.6% of genuine clips come back “inconclusive”; 5% are wrongly flagged.
Read this before the numbers
These figures describe the model on public datasets of pre-2023 fakes, not real-world accuracy against modern voice cloning. Tumaini’s protection does not depend on the detector: payments are held until independent verification whatever the score.
Why not the best-known model?
AASIST scores 1.72% on its own benchmark but 39.6% on real-world English and 42.1% on Arabic — near chance. We selected on data the models were not trained on, and published the failure.
Model weights: CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 (non-commercial). Suitable for this research prototype; a commercial launch needs a licensed or self-trained model.
Contextual intelligence
Gemini reads the situation. It does not judge authenticity.
A multimodal model is good at understanding what a message, picture or recording is asking for. It is not a validated deepfake detector, and Tumaini never treats it as one.
Live status
The adapter, schemas, limits and consent flow are built and unit-tested. It is switched on only after credentials are supplied and authentication, sample runs, schema validation, latency, cost and fallback have been tested. No Gemini output is shown anywhere on this site until then.
Gemini may
- Describe relevant content
- Extract claims and claimed identities
- Find requests for money, codes or personal data
- Extract web addresses
- Spot urgency, secrecy and other pressure
- Help explain evidence in English and Arabic
Gemini must not
- Authorise a payment
- Declare a signature valid
- Override C2PA verification
- Override a trusted-contact check
- Release a protected action
- Turn an uncertain result into certainty
How that is enforced
- Output must match a strict schema; anything else is discarded.
- Signals merge through a pure function that can only add caution — tested to never change a decision or remove a check.
- Per-request consent; card numbers, IBANs, codes and emails are removed first.
- Timeouts, one retry, per-user and daily caps, and a per-request cost ceiling.
- Content and responses are not stored; only metadata is audited.
- If the provider is down or unset, every other check still works.
Image and video
Not advertised until validated.
Tumaini checks images and video for C2PA Content Credentials today. Manipulation and deepfake detection for images and video is in research: candidate pretrained models are being assessed, and none is integrated.
Before any detector is integrated, it must show
- A licence that permits our use
- Published, downloadable weights
- CPU-feasible inference
- Results on independent data, not its training set
- Robustness to compression and re-encoding
- Measured false-positive and false-negative rates
- Generalisation to unseen generators
- An acceptable operating cost
Provenance and detection answer different questions. A valid C2PA manifest says who signed a file and whether it changed; it says nothing about whether the scene is real. A missing manifest is “unknown”, never “fake”. The same discipline applied to voice: the best-known benchmark model scored near chance on real-world audio, so a different model was selected on data none of them were trained on.
Privacy and security
Private by default.
Minimal collection
Uploads are analysed and discarded; the app keeps a SHA-256 fingerprint and the result. 4 MB limit.
Tenant isolation
Each visitor's workspace and each organisation are isolated by PostgreSQL row-level security, not only in code.
No covert monitoring
Tumaini only sees what a person chooses to share. The mobile design uses user-initiated sharing, never screen reading.
Keys at rest
Issuer keys are AES-256-GCM encrypted under a server-held key and destroyed on revocation. Production needs HSM/KMS.
External providers
Nothing is sent to an external AI provider without explicit, per-request consent and a clear disclosure.
Never credentials
Tumaini never asks for passwords, PINs or one-time codes, and strips them from text sent to models.
API integration
The same engine, one call away.
Verify a signed communication at the moment of payment, issue sandbox receipts, verify evidence reports. A working integration with a fictional bank calls the live backend.
Known limitations
What Tumaini cannot do yet.
- Voice-model accuracy is measured on public datasets of pre-2023 fakes; modern cloning may evade it. The weights are licensed for non-commercial use only.
- No image or video deepfake detection. No native mobile app or share extension.
- Transcription makes mistakes, especially in Arabic; rule-based extraction can miss unusual phrasing.
- The trust registry and C2PA trust anchors are demo-only. Organisations and money are fictional.
- Trusted-contact delivery is simulated on screen. Gemini contextual analysis is not enabled.
- The full limitations list