Research prototype. Synthetic data and simulated payments only — not an official or production security service. Limitations

Demonstration centre

Pick a situation. See what Tumaini does.

Six everyday situations. Each one runs on the live system — the real voice model, signatures, request checks and payment holds — with fictional people and organisations, in your own private workspace.

For anyone with family who might call for help

Family voice impersonation

Voice note · chat app · from “Omar” on a new number

“It's me, I lost my phone. Please send AED 5,000 today. Don't tell Dad.”

Fictional example

What Tumaini checks

  • Voice deepfake checkOpen AI model scores the recording — it can be wrong either wayReal check
  • What it asks you to doMoney, urgency, secrecy and a “new number” are foundReal check
  • Payment holdThe payment cannot go ahead until it is verifiedReal check
  • Confirm with the real OmarSent to the number you saved earlier — delivery is simulated on screenSimulated

Please check before sending money.

We cannot confirm that the speaker is your family member.

Next step: Call him using a number you already know.

Live runs use synthetic content in your own private, resettable workspace. No real money or organisations are involved.

For technical reviewers

Workspace controls, the AI-outage test and every backend scenario, run directly.

Your private demo workspace

Starting session
Database downVoice model unavailableOutage simulation off

Voice-note language

  • A

    A voice note from “your son”

    A synthetic voice note asks for AED 5,000 urgently. Tumaini analyses the audio, extracts the request, holds the payment and asks Omar on the number you saved two weeks ago.

    • Voice deepfake analysis
    • Request extraction
    • Payment hold
    • Trusted-contact check
    English voice note
  • B

    A genuine government notice

    A fictional authority sends a digitally signed notice. Tumaini verifies signer, trust status, signature, integrity, expiry and scope — and shows the notice authorises no payment.

    • Signature
    • Trust registry
    • Integrity
    • Scope
  • B2

    A signed bank payment request

    A fictional bank requests a AED 150 card fee with a signed authorisation. Only that exact payment can be released, once. Try changing the amount.

    • Exact-scope release
    • Replay protection
  • C

    The same request, tampered

    Someone intercepts the bank message and changes the amount and account. The signature no longer matches the text, so the claim is rejected and the payment is held.

    • Integrity failure
    • Rejected authorisation
  • E

    A child receives a “game prize” message

    A message asks a child for the code sent to a parent's phone and their card number, and to keep it secret. Real request extraction and the risk policy flag it as do-not-share.

    • Request extraction
    • Credential request
    • Secrecy
  • D

    The AI service goes down

    Voice analysis is switched off. Tumaini says so plainly — and the payment stays on hold, because protection never depends on the model.

    • Safe degradation
    English voice note

Test it yourself

What is real: the cryptography, the voice model, the C2PA validation, the database-enforced payment states and the audit chain. What is simulated: the people, organisations, money, and delivery of messages to trusted contacts. Full limitations

View all cases in this workspace →